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Pangloss Responds 
Daniel A. Crane* 
I am afraid that William Shieber and I are speaking past each other.  I 
agree wholeheartedly with his assertion that anyone who believes that 
political appointees do not exert a considerable influence over the antitrust 
agencies is naïve.  However, Technocracy and Antitrust
1
 does not advance 
the Panglossian view that the antitrust agencies are apolitical, if by that we 
mean that robotic machines devoid of human perspective or ideological 
commitment churn out scientifically predetermined antitrust results.  Instead, 
my article extends and updates Richard Hofstadter’s claim
2
 that antitrust has 
ceased to be a popular political movement, that it has virtually disappeared 
from national political debate, that it is beyond the view or concern of the 
average voter, that Presidents and elected officials no longer pay much 
attention to it, and that the enterprise is largely run by specialized experts.  It 
is in that sense that antitrust has become “technocratic.” 
To say that antitrust is largely technocratic (although my article also 
discusses a number of ways in which it is not), is not to say that antitrust 
cases are devoid of political maneuvering.  Indeed, contrary to the impression 
left by Mr. Shieber, in the article I explicitly acknowledge that there was 
much political maneuvering in the Microsoft case.
3
  I note that “[p]oliticians 
from the State of Washington (where Microsoft is headquartered) lobbied 
behind the scenes for Microsoft while politicians from Utah (where 
Microsoft’s rival Novell is located) lobbied against Microsoft” and that 
“Microsoft lavished its ample resources to make friends and influence 
people.”
4
  The important point, however, is that neither political party 
elevated the Microsoft case to a campaign issue and the skirmishing did not 
track ideological fault lines.  Indeed, it is worth noting that Robert Bork, the 
very portrait of Chicago School conservatism,
5
 became a high-profile 
advocate for Netscape against Microsoft
6
 while Democratic politicians from 
Washington were standing up for their hometown favorite. 
 
 *   Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; Visiting 
Professor, University of Chicago Law School. 
1. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1159 (2008). 
2. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1966). 
3. Crane, supra note 1, at 1170. 
4. Id. 
5. On this point, see my book review essay, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV (forthcoming 2009). 
6. Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the Crucible of United States v. 
Microsoft, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 167, 200–01 (2005). 
44 Texas Law Review See Also [Vol. 87:43 
 
Mr. Shieber thinks that the best evidence of ideological influences in 
Microsoft is that the Bush Justice Department ended up settling the litigation 
on terms explicitly rejected two years earlier by the Clinton Administration.  
However, Mr. Shieber omits to mention a game-changing event that occurred 
in the intervening years.  The D.C. Circuit vacated large portions of the 
District Court opinion, upheld a number of Microsoft’s practices as legal, 
entirely vacated Judge Jackson’s remedy decision, and remanded the case to 
a new district judge after finding impropriety on Judge Jackson’s part.
7
  
Although the Circuit Court affirmed some important findings of liability 
against Microsoft, the decision altered the dynamics of the case in 
Microsoft’s favor.  In particular, it took away the government’s whip 
hands—a break-up remedy and Judge Jackson. 
I do not doubt that the Bush Administration’s greater friendliness to big 
business played a role in the Microsoft settlement and its merger policy.  I do 
not doubt that ideology continues to play a role in antitrust enforcement, that 
the choice of political appointees matters, and that “conservative” 
administrations will generally pursue less enforcement than “liberal” 
administrations.  My article did not claim that ideology and politics have no 
more purchase in antitrust.  On the other hand, I think it is also beyond 
dispute that the ideological chasm in antitrust has narrowed considerably, 
that antitrust has lost its popular political salience, that inter-administration 
shifts in enforcement are far less pronounced today than they were during the 
first half of the twentieth century, and that antitrust today is largely the 
province of experts. 
Whether this is all to the good is another question.  I believe it is, but 
since Mr. Shieber does not raise that question, I will let it rest as well. 
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